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DISTINGUISHED GUESTS; LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:
It is a pleasure for me to deliver the keynote address of the second Osgoode 
Hall Law Journal Symposium, which is dedicated to the “understanding and 
taming of public and private corruption in the 21st century.” I wish to thank 
York University and Osgoode Hall Law School for organizing this conference on 
a topic that was at the centre of my work as Director of the Division for Treaty 
Affairs at the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).
I say “was” because, as of next month, I will be assuming a new position at 
the World Intellectual Property Organization in Geneva.1 So now is actually a 
good moment in time for me to look back at our work at UNODC and take 
stock of where we are, what we have accomplished, and which challenges we 
still have to overcome in order to “understand and tame” corruption. Therefore, 
echoing the theme of this symposium, let us first have a look at how we can better 
understand corruption.
I. UNDERSTANDING CORRUPTION
According to our motto, UNODC is working to “mak[e] the world safer 
from drugs, crime and terrorism.”2 In doing so, one of our key targets must 
be corruption. And indeed, UNODC is the Secretariat to the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption. But what exactly is corruption?
A. DEFINING AND MEASURING CORRUPTION
We use the word all the time and we all seem to know what it means; yet 
corruption is notoriously difficult to define. In its broadest meaning—and 
that is the one often used in the media—corruption can denote any unethical 
behaviour, any deviation from some ideal ethical standard. Indeed, according to 
a public opinion definition, “corruption” involves acts, or patterns of behaviour, 
that would be viewed by most citizens as wrongful abuses of power, whether or 
not they are illegal as defined by the law.3 Similarly, according to a public interest 
definition, “corruption” involves acts, or patterns of behaviour, that contravene 
1. At the time of publication, Mr. Sandage is currently the Deputy Director General for the 
Patents and Technology Sector at the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). 
2. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Making the world safer from drugs, crime and 
terrorism” (2015), online: <https://www.unodc.org/documents/brussels/EU-UNODC_10_
Years_Brochure/EU-UNODC-brochure_WEB.pdf>.
3. Matthew Stephenson, “On Different Understandings of ‘Corruption’,” The Global 
Anticorruption Blog (blog) (13 February 2014), online: <http://globalanticorruptionblog.
com/2014/02/13/on-differing-understandings-of-corruption/#more-278>.
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the public interest—whether or not the actions in question are illegal and/or the 
subject of widespread disapproval.4 Obviously, these definitions are too broad 
and too vague to be workable concepts for an international organization based 
on international law. 
Transparency International, the anti-corruption non-governmental 
organization (NGO), defines corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power for 
private gain.”5 In a similar vein, the World Bank has labelled it “the abuse of public 
office for private gain.”6 These definitions are straightforward and succinct. But 
they are too broad and too narrow at the same time. The World Bank definition, 
for example, would seem to exclude corruption in the private sector. And the 
term “abuse” is an ethical or moral concept, not a legal one. 
We encounter the same problems when we try to measure corruption—a 
necessity in order to determine if anti-corruption measures work. The best-known 
and most cited index on corruption is Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perception Index. But as the name indicates, it does not even purport to measure 
corruption—it measures the perception of corruption. Perceptions, while perhaps 
important in their own right, are not necessarily based in reality. Indeed, some 
recent research7 indicates that national corruption perceptions are only weakly 
correlated with survey results asking about individuals’ personal experience with 
bribery. To date, no reliable index to measure corruption itself—or even proxies 
of corruption8—has been developed.
However, I might add that an interesting paper9 has examined the propensity 
of United Nations (UN) diplomats to abuse their diplomatic immunity to violate 
New York City parking rules, and found that this propensity was greater for 
diplomats from countries ranked as more corrupt according to the World Bank’s 
4. Ibid.
5. “FAQs on Corruption” (2016), online: <http://www.transparency.org/whoweare/
organisation/faqs_on_corruption/2/>.
6. The World Bank Group, “Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World 
Bank” online: <http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/corruptn/cor02.htm>.
7. Matthew Stephenson, “Objective Validation of Subjective Corruption Perceptions?” The 
Global Anticorruption Blog (blog) (18 April 2014), online: <https://globalanticorruptionblog.
com/2014/04/18/objective-validation-of-subjective-corruption-perceptions/#more-262>. 
8. To address this perennial measurement problem, the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource 
Centre launched a “Proxy Challenge” in 2013 to find the best proxy indicator, or basket of 
indicators, to measure corruption. See U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, “The Proxy 
Challenge Competition” (2013), online: <http://www.u4.no/articles/the-proxy-challenge-
competition/#sthash.6dRW8Daw.dpuf>.
9. Raymond Fisman & Edward Miguel, “Corruption, Norms, and Legal Enforcement: 
Evidence from Diplomatic Parking Tickets” (2007) 115:6 J Pol Econ 1020. 
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Control of Corruption index. So it looks like there’s at least some evidence 
that perception-based corruption measures are correlated with more objective 
quantifications of dishonest behaviour.
These problems with defining and measuring corruption might lead us to echo 
the words of United States Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart who famously 
wrote, when trying to define obscenity: “I know it when I see it.”10 But such a 
subjective approach is of course highly problematic and would run counter to 
fundamental principles of law when we discuss the criminalization of corruption.
B. THE APPROACH OF THE UNCAC
The drafters of the United Nations Convention against Corruption11 (UNCAC) 
therefore—wisely, I would submit—chose a pragmatic approach to the problem. 
Despite its title, the Convention does not contain a definition of corruption. 
Rather, it contains a number of specific offences that are generally recognised 
as manifestations of corruption, which States Parties to the Convention are 
obliged to penalize.12
These offences are: bribery of national public officials; active bribery of 
foreign officials and officials of international organizations; embezzlement by a 
public official; money laundering; and obstruction of justice.13 Moreover, there 
is an obligation to consider the criminalization of passive bribery of foreign 
officials; trading in influence; abuse of functions; illicit enrichment; bribery and 
embezzlement in the private sector; and concealment. Some of these offences—
like bribery—are classic corruption offences, while others—like trading in 
influence—are quite innovative provisions. All of them, however, contain 
comprehensive, state-of-the-art definitions of corruption offences, so it’s worth 
having a closer look at some of them.
According to Articles 15 and 16 of the Convention, the bribery of national 
and foreign public officials is defined as the promise, offering, or giving of an 
undue advantage for the official or another person, in order that the official act 
in the exercise of his duties.14 This means that not only direct bribes to an official 
are included but also so-called third party benefits. These benefits can be of any 
nature, as the term “undue advantage” captures both material and immaterial 
ones. Moreover, the UNCAC goes beyond, for instance, the Organisation for 
10. Jacobellis v Ohio, 378 US 184 at 197 (1964). 
11. 31 October 2003, A/58/422 (entered into force 14 December 2005) [UNCAC].
12. Ibid, art 12 at para 1.
13. Ibid, arts 14-17, 25.
14. Ibid, arts 15-16. 
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Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Anti-bribery Convention 
and the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in that it does not require a breach of 
duties. That means that the UNCAC clearly disallows so-called facilitation or 
greasing payments. Finally, the UNCAC contains a very broad definition of the 
term “official,” which includes not only classic civil servants but also persons 
holding a legislative, executive, or judicial office, whether appointed or elected 
and whether paid or unpaid. 
Article 18 encourages States Parties to criminalize trading in influence.15 
This means that an intermediary is bribed in order that she abuse her real or 
supposed influence with a view to obtaining an undue advantage from the State 
for the original instigator or a third party. This innovative provision goes beyond 
traditional corruption offences and seeks to outlaw a more sophisticated form 
of corruption. Articles 21 and 22 oblige Member States to consider adopting 
measures to criminalize bribery and embezzlement in the private sector. While 
the incriminated acts here are limited to those committed in the course of 
commercial activities and entailing a breach of duties, the provisions mark an 
important paradigm shift in that they establish that corruption also happens 
outside the public sector and should be punished accordingly.  
Finally, to conclude my very cursory overview of the criminalization 
provisions in the Convention, let me mention Article 26, which obliges Member 
States to establish the liability of legal persons for participation in corruption 
offences. Such liability may be criminal, civil, or administrative, but it must 
ensure that effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions, including fines, 
can be imposed on companies. So, in the context of UNCAC, this is what we 
understand by corruption. Of course, Member States are free to go beyond the 
Convention. But, for the first time, we now have a globally recognised common 
denominator for the understanding of corruption. That is no small feat in itself. 
Before I move on to the taming of corruption and UNODC’s role in it, I believe 
that, for a proper understanding of corruption, we also need to understand why 
we have to fight it.
C. WHY WE NEED TO FIGHT CORRUPTION
At first glance, this may seem a superfluous effort. Don’t we all agree that 
corruption is bad and that it is important to fight it? In principle, yes. Nevertheless, 
in practice, some, e.g., in the business community, might still think that we 
corruption fighters are naïve do-gooders, who know nothing about the reality 
15. Ibid, art 18.
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on the ground and that sometimes palm-greasing is necessary and unavoidable. 
Indeed, some have gone so far as to argue that there are certain good forms of 
corruption16 or “honest graft.”17 Others, like Thomas Piketty in his celebrated 
oeuvre, Capital in the Twenty-First Century,18 seem to overlook the issue. As some 
commentators have noted, in his analysis of the scale and perils of rising economic 
inequality, corruption seems to be the elephant in the room that Piketty fails to 
notice.19 Therefore, it cannot be repeated often enough that corruption is not 
only morally and ethically wrong but also economically harmful, and that it is 
lethal for countries’ development.
Corruption is not simply a crime. It is the enabler of many other criminal 
activities such as transnational organized crime and drug trafficking. According 
to James D. Wolfensohn, the former President of the World Bank, corruption 
is “the largest single inhibitor of equitable economic development.”20 Indeed, 
corruption has a devastating impact on development. It is estimated that up to 
$40 billion US is stolen from developing countries every year, robbing citizens of 
better education, better healthcare, and better lives, and denying them hope for 
a better future. Corruption breeds more corruption and facilitates other crimes. 
It undermines democracy and weakens good governance and the rule of law. It 
squanders precious resources and talent, keeping countries from fulfilling their 
potential. And, in the worst case, it costs lives.
16. Thomas B Edsall, “The Value of Political Corruption,” New York Times (5 August 2014), 
online: <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/06/opinion/thomas-edsall-the-value-of-political-
corruption.html?_r=0>. 
17. George Washington Plunkitt, “Honest Graft and Dishonest Graft” in William L Riordon, 
Plunkitt of Tammany Hall: A Series of Very Plain Talks on Very Practical Politics (New York: 
Signet Classics, 2015); Matthew Stephenson, “More Confused & Confusing Commentary 
on Corruption, Earmarks, and Campaign Finance,” The Global Anticorruption Blog 
(blog) (12 August 2014), online: <http://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2014/08/12/
more-confused-confusing-commentary-on-corruption-earmarks-and-campaign-
finance/#more-1864>.  
18. Translated by Arthur Goldhammer (United States of America: President and Fellows of 
Harvard College, 2014).
19. Dieter Zinnbauer, “Piketty: Diagnosing Inequality and Prescribing 
a Dose of Anti-Corruption,” Transparency International (25 
August 2014), online: <http://blog.transparency.org/2014/08/25/
piketty-diagnosing-inequality-and-prescribing-a-dose-of-anti-corruption>. 
20. “Voices for the Poor,” The Washington Post (10 November 1999), online: <https://
www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1999/11/10/voices-for-the-poor/
af94e9aa-0b78-436a-96dd-5b331e67fdce/>.
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It costs the lives of people dying of Ebola—as a recent article in the New 
York Times on delayed help for Sierra Leone has shown.21 It costs the lives of 
witnesses and whistle-blowers who are murdered to silence them. But, on a 
much greater scale, the events in Tunisia, Egypt, and Ukraine, among others, 
have shown that corruption costs lives because it is a threat to international peace 
and security.22 The impact of corruption on the private sector is also considerable. 
Corruption stifles economic growth, distorts competition, and presents serious 
legal and reputational risks. It keeps investors away, acting as a hidden ‘tax’ or 
illegal overhead charge, and thereby increasing costs for companies and, further 
down the chain, their consumers.
But during the last decade, we have experienced a positive change in 
attitudes towards corruption. There is now a broad consensus that bribery and 
corruption are no longer acceptable forms of doing business. The world has 
embraced the notion of a level playing field for all, and more and more people 
and societies are embracing universal principles of accountability, fairness, 
transparency, and equality.
One reason for this change is the existence of international institutions, like 
UNODC, and anti-corruption treaties like the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, 
the Council of Europe Conventions, and the UNCAC. Among them, the 
UNCAC stands out as the only universal legal anti-corruption instrument. It 
embodies innovative and globally accepted anti-corruption standards applicable 
to both the public and private sectors and provides a comprehensive approach to 
preventing and combating corruption. With 172 States Parties, the UNCAC has 
nearly achieved universal adherence. So let me now turn to how we can use this 
instrument in our efforts to effectively tame corruption.
II. TAMING CORRUPTION: THE ROLE OF THE UNCAC
In doing so, I will first outline the substantive content and structure of the 
Convention, as well as the institutional framework which was put in place in 
order to support Member States in strengthening their legal, institutional, and 
operational capacities to implement the provisions of UNCAC at the domestic 
21. Adam Nossiter, “Ebola Help for Sierra Leone Is Nearby, but Delayed on the Docks,” New 
York Times (6 October 2014), online: <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/06/world/africa/
sierra-leone-ebola-medical-supplies-delayed-docks.html?_r=0>. 
22. Working Group on Corruption and Security, “Corruption: The Unrecognized Threat to 
International Security,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (June 2014), online: 
<http://carnegieendowment.org/files/corruption_and_security.pdf>.
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level, and to cooperate internationally towards effectively combating the 
transnational dimensions of corruption.
A. AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNCAC
1. CHAPTER	II	(PREVENTION)
The UNCAC devotes an entire chapter to the prevention of corruption, thus 
demonstrating the significance of preventive action against this scourge. The 
Convention requires States Parties to introduce effective anti-corruption policies 
and practices. It calls for the introduction of a variety of measures concerning 
both the public and the private sectors. Such measures include: institutional 
arrangements, such as the establishment of specific anti-corruption bodies with 
a mandate to implement preventive anti-corruption policies and practices; codes 
of conduct and measures requiring public officials to make declarations regarding 
financial or other aspects that may cause conflict of interests; and policies 
promoting good governance, the rule of law, transparency, and accountability, 
including promoting transparency in the financing of election campaigns and 
political parties. The Convention pays special attention to the issue of public 
procurement, as a sector particularly prone to corruption. It further contains 
measures to promote transparency and accountability in the management of 
public finances. The Convention enjoins States Parties to take measures for the 
prevention of corruption in the judiciary. In addition, concrete measures are 
specified for the prevention of money-laundering practices related to corruption.
Apart from the development or reinforcement of preventive policies in the 
public sector, States Parties to the UNCAC are also required to take appropriate 
preventive measures and establish regulatory regimes in order to prevent 
corruption in the private sector. The Convention further calls on States Parties to 
promote actively the involvement of NGOs and community-based organizations, 
as well as other elements of civil society, and to undertake public information 
activities and education programmes for the purpose of raising public awareness 
of the threats posed by corruption and the most suitable methods to combat it.
2. CHAPTER	III	(CRIMINALIZATION	AND	LAW	ENFORCEMENT)
If prevention is the carrot, then criminal law is the stick. As already mentioned, 
the Convention obliges States Parties to make acts of corruption punishable under 
penal law. These so-called criminalization provisions are contained in Chapter III. 
The UNCAC includes a comprehensive set of criminalization provisions, both 
mandatory and optional, and I have already spoken about the most important 
ones. The inclusion of optional criminalization provisions was deemed necessary 
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because of constitutional impediments or other fundamental legal principles in 
some countries that prevent them from establishing the relevant criminal offences 
in their domestic law.23 
Implementation may be carried out through new laws or amendments of 
existing ones. Domestic offences established in accordance with the requirements 
of the UNCAC, whether based on pre-existing laws or newly established ones, 
will often correspond to offences under the Convention in name and terms used, 
but this is not essential. Close conformity is desirable, but is not required, as long 
as the range of acts covered by the Convention is criminalized.
23. An interesting example is that of illicit enrichment. The obligation for States Parties to 
consider creating such an offence is subject to their constitution and the fundamental 
principles of their legal system. This effectively recognizes that the illicit enrichment offence, 
in which the defendant has to provide a reasonable explanation for the significant increase 
in his or her assets, may in some jurisdictions be considered as contrary to the right to be 
presumed innocent until proven guilty under the law. The presumption of innocence is 
invoked because the crime of illicit enrichment hinges upon presuming that the accumulated 
wealth is corruptly acquired, unless the contrary is proved. Therefore, it is important for 
national legislators to take into consideration when drafting relevant legislation potential 
conflicts with human rights law standards of fair trial and due process rights, which, 
particularly with regard to the presumption of innocence, may entail the following:
• that it is upon the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused person (i.e., 
burden of proof );
• that it is the right of the accused not to testify against himself or herself; and
• that the accused has a right of silence.
 As far as the burden of proof is concerned, it has been argued that the prosecution is relieved 
of the full burden of proof since it need not directly adduce evidence of corruption, but shifts 
the burden of proof to the accused requiring him or her to refute that the wealth is illicitly 
acquired. However, the point has also been clearly made that there is no presumption of guilt 
and that the burden of proof remains on the prosecution, as it has to demonstrate that the 
enrichment is beyond one’s lawful income. The prosecution merely suspects that the wealth 
of the accused was illicitly acquired and places the burden of proof to the accused to adduce 
the contrary. This may, thus, be viewed as a rebuttable presumption. Once such a case is 
made, the defendant can then offer a reasonable or credible explanation.
 National jurisprudence has provided examples of shifting the burden of proof so as to give 
way to statutory exceptions and public policy needs. In other cases, arguments were made in 
favour of striking a fair balance between public and individual interests. In general, there is 
always a need to comply with the so called “proportionality principle” when judging on the 
impact of such criminalization measures on human rights standards.
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The UNCAC has further included a wide array of criminal justice and law 
enforcement measures in its Chapter III to support the criminalization provisions 
and ensure their effectiveness. Such measures include:
• The establishment of jurisdiction over offences falling within its 
scope of application;24 
• Prosecution, adjudication, and sanctions in corruption-related cases;25 
24. UNCAC, supra note 11, art 42. The UNCAC requires that States Parties establish 
jurisdiction when the offences are committed in their territory or on board aircraft and 
vessels registered under their laws. States Parties are also required to establish jurisdiction 
in cases where they cannot extradite a person on grounds of nationality. In these cases, the 
general principle aut dedere aut judicare (“extradite or prosecute”) would apply. See ibid at 
para 3; art 44 at para 11. In addition, States Parties are invited to consider the establishment 
of jurisdiction in cases where their nationals are victimized; where the offence is committed 
by a national or stateless person residing in their territory; where the offence is linked to 
money-laundering planned to be committed in their territory; or the offence is committed 
against the State. See ibid, art 42 at para 2. Finally, States Parties are required to consult 
with other interested States in appropriate circumstances in order to avoid, as much as 
possible, the risk of improper overlapping of exercised jurisdictions. See ibid at para 5. States 
Parties may also wish to consider the option of establishing their jurisdiction over offences 
established in accordance with the UNCAC when extradition is refused for reasons other 
than nationality. See ibid at para 4.
25. Ibid, art 30. Article 30 encompasses provisions with regard to the investigation and 
prosecution of corruption-related offences and the important complex issue of immunities. 
The Article devotes significant attention to sanctions—both criminal sanctions strictu 
sensu and “ancillary” sanctions—as well as provisions on disciplinary measures and 
sanctions relating to the gravity of the offence or linked to the nature of the offence, such 
as disqualification. Finally, the Article deals with the rehabilitation of offenders. Article 30 
requires that: 
• States Parties provide for sanctions that take into account the “gravity” of that offence 
(ibid at para 1);
• States Parties provide for an appropriate balance between any immunities or jurisdictional 
privileges accorded to its public officials for the performance of their functions and the 
possibility, when necessary, of effectively investigating, prosecuting, and adjudicating 
offences established in accordance with the Convention (ibid at para 2);
• decisions on release pending trial or appeal take into consideration the need to ensure 
the presence of the defendant at subsequent criminal proceedings (ibid at para 4); and
• the gravity of the offences concerned be taken into account when considering the 
eventuality of early release or parole of persons convicted of such offences (ibid at para 5).
 Besides these mandatory provisions, Article 30 stipulates in a non-mandatory manner that:
• States Parties consider establishing procedures through which a public official accused 
of an offence established in accordance with the Convention may, where appropriate, be 
removed, suspended, or reassigned by the appropriate authority (ibid at para 6);
• States Parties consider establishing procedures for the disqualification for a period 
of time determined by domestic law, of persons convicted of offences established in 
accordance with the Convention from: (a) holding public office, and (b) holding office 
in an enterprise owned in whole or in part by the State (ibid at para 7); and
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• Sufficiently long statutes of limitation for offences covered by 
the Convention;26
• The freezing, seizure, and confiscation of proceeds of crime derived 
from offences established in accordance with the Convention;27
• The protection of witnesses, experts, and victims;28
• States Parties endeavour to promote the reintegration into society of persons convicted 
for offences established pursuant to the Convention (ibid at para 10).
26. Ibid, art 29. Article 29 lays down the obligation of States Parties to establish, where 
appropriate, under their domestic law, a long statute of limitations period in which to 
commence proceedings for any offence established in accordance with the Convention, as 
well as to establish a longer period or provide for the suspension of the statute of limitations 
in cases where the alleged offender has evaded the administration of justice.
27. Ibid, art 31. Article 31 deals with confiscation—the permanent deprivation of property by 
order of a court or other competent authority, as defined by the Convention (see ibid, art 
2(g))—as the most important legal tool to deprive offenders of their ill-gotten gains. The 
regime promoted by the Convention revolves around the concept of the confiscation of 
“proceeds of crime,” defined by the Convention as “any property derived from or obtained, 
directly or indirectly, through the commission of an offence” (ibid, art 2(e)). Article 31 also 
establishes the minimum scope of the confiscation of the proceeds of crime (ibid, art 31 at 
paras 4-6). As a complementary measure, the Convention recommends that States Parties 
consider reversing the burden of proof in order to facilitate the determination of the origin of 
such proceeds (ibid at para 8), a concept already applied in several jurisdictions. This concept 
, however, needs to be distinguished from a reversal of the burden of proof regarding the 
elements of the offence, which is directly linked with the presumption of innocence. Article 
31 further requires specific measures for two other important elements of the confiscation 
regime: international cooperation (ibid at para 7) and the protection of third-party rights 
(ibid at para 9). 
28. Ibid, art 32. Article 32 includes both mandatory and non-mandatory provisions. As a 
mandatory provision, the Article requires that each State Party must take appropriate 
measures in accordance with its domestic legal system and within its means to provide 
effective protection from potential retaliation or intimidation for witnesses and experts who 
give testimony concerning offences established in accordance with the Convention and, 
as appropriate, for their relatives and other persons close to them (ibid at para 1). It also 
specifies certain measures that State Parties may envisage in order to provide for the necessary 
protection of witnesses and experts (ibid at para 2). While Article 32 includes a provision on 
procedures for the physical protection against intimidation and retaliation (ibid at para 2(a)), 
it also focuses on evidentiary rules ensuring the safety of witnesses and experts with regard to 
their testimony (ibid at para 2(b)). Another non-mandatory provision requires State Parties 
to consider implementing cross-border witness protection through relocating victims who 
may be in danger in other countries (ibid at para 3). The Article requires States Parties to 
apply its provisions to victims insofar as they are witnesses (ibid at para 4). Finally, it requires 
States Parties to enable the views and concerns of victims to be presented and considered at 
appropriate stages of criminal proceedings against offenders (ibid at para 5). This provision is 
relevant in cases in which a victim is not a witness.
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• The protection of reporting persons, often called “whistle-blowers”;29
• The establishment of independent authorities specialized in 
combating corruption through law enforcement;30 and
• The curtailment of bank secrecy in the case of domestic criminal 
investigations of relevant offences.31
3. CHAPTER	IV	(INTERNATIONAL	COOPERATION)
Corruption is no longer an issue confined within national boundaries, but a 
transnational phenomenon that affects different jurisdictions, thus rendering 
international cooperation essential. The increasingly international mobility of 
offenders and the use of advanced technology and international banking for the 
commission of offences make it more necessary than ever for law enforcement 
and judicial authorities to collaborate and assist each other in an effective manner 
in investigations, prosecutions, and judicial proceedings related to such offences. 
Therefore, UNCAC requires States Parties to afford one another the widest 
measure of mutual legal assistance in investigations, prosecutions, and judicial 
proceedings in relation to the offences covered by the Convention. Moreover, 
chapter IV incorporates detailed and extensive provisions on all forms of 
international cooperation, namely extradition, mutual legal assistance, transfer of 
sentenced persons, transfer of criminal proceedings, law enforcement cooperation, 
joint investigations, and cooperation for using special investigative techniques. 
These provisions are generally based on the precedent of the United Nations 
29. Ibid, art 33. Article 33 is a non-mandatory provision. However, States Parties may wish to 
keep in mind that the provision complements the Article dealing with the protection of 
witnesses and experts. Article 33 is intended to cover those individuals who may possess 
information that is not of such detail to constitute evidence in the legal sense of the word. 
Such information is likely to be available at a rather early stage of a case and is also likely to 
constitute an indication of wrongdoing. In corruption cases, because of their complexity, 
such indications have proved to be useful to alert competent authorities and permit them 
to make key decisions about whether to launch an investigation. The UNCAC uses the 
term “reporting persons” (ibid). This was deemed to be sufficient to reflect the essence 
of the intended meaning, while making clear that there is a distinction between the 
persons referred to with this term and witnesses. It was also deemed preferable to the term 
“whistle-blowers,” which is a colloquialism that cannot be accurately and precisely translated 
into many languages.
30. Ibid, art 36. Article 36 mandates States Parties to have in place a body or bodies or persons 
specialized in combating corruption through law enforcement, performing investigative and 
possibly prosecutorial functions.
31. Ibid, art 40. States Parties are required in Article 40 to remove any obstacle that may arise 
from protective laws and regulations to domestic criminal investigations relating to offences 
established under the UNCAC.
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Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), sometimes 
going beyond it, and provide a much more comprehensive legal framework on 
relevant matters than that of the existing regional instruments.
4. CHAPTER	V	(ASSET	RECOVERY)
In what has been recognized as a major breakthrough, the UNCAC contains a 
comprehensive chapter on asset recovery. This means that proceeds of corruption 
that have been transferred abroad—often to tax havens or jurisdictions known for 
their strict bank secrecy regulations—are actually returned to the countries from 
which they have been ‘stolen.’ To that end, the Convention includes substantive 
provisions laying down specific measures and mechanisms for cooperation with a 
view to facilitating the repatriation of assets derived from offences covered by the 
UNCAC to their country of origin.
Chapter V provides for a comprehensive framework for international 
cooperation, which incorporates, mutatis mutandis, the more general mutual legal 
assistance requirements and sets forth procedures for international cooperation 
in confiscation matters. These are important powers, as criminals frequently seek 
to hide proceeds, instrumentalities, and evidence of crime in more than one 
jurisdiction, in order to thwart efforts to locate and seize them.32
32. See ibid, art 55 at para 1. This paragraph, in particular, mandates a State Party to provide 
assistance “to the greatest extent possible” in accordance with domestic law, when receiving a 
request from another State Party having jurisdiction over an offence established in accordance 
with the UNCAC for confiscation of proceeds of crime, property, equipment, or other 
instrumentalities, either by recognizing and enforcing a foreign confiscation order, or by 
bringing an application for a domestic order before the competent authorities on the basis 
of information provided by the other State Party. See also ibid, art 54 at para 1(c). This 
paragraph states that States Parties, in order to provide mutual legal assistance pursuant 
to article 55 with respect to property acquired through or involved in the commission of 
an offence established in accordance with the Convention, must, in accordance with their 
domestic law, consider taking such measures as may be necessary to allow confiscation 
of such property without a criminal conviction in cases in which the offender cannot be 
prosecuted by reason of death, flight, or absence or in other appropriate cases. While 
confiscation without a criminal conviction (“NCB confiscation”) should never be a 
substitute for criminal prosecution, in many instances, such confiscation may be the only 
way to recover the proceeds of corruption and to exact some measure of justice. Countries 
that do not have the ability to confiscate without a conviction are challenged because they 
lack one of the important tools available to recover stolen assets. NCB confiscation is 
valuable because the influence of corrupt officials and other practical realities may prevent 
criminal investigations entirely, or delay them until after the official has died or absconded. 
Alternatively, the corrupt official may have immunity from prosecution. Because an NCB 
confiscation regime is not dependent on a criminal conviction, it can proceed regardless 
of death, flight, or any immunity the corrupt official might enjoy. Although an increasing 
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5. THE	“INSTITUTIONAL	ARCHITECTURE”	OF	THE	CONVENTION
I would like to finish my overview of the Convention with a few words on its 
institutional architecture. The Conference of the States Parties to UNCAC was 
established33 to improve the capacity of, and cooperation between, States Parties 
to achieve the objectives of the Convention, and to promote and review its 
implementation. The Conference of the States Parties to the UNCAC is tasked 
with supporting States Parties and signatories in their implementation of the 
Convention, and provides policy guidance to UNODC for the development and 
execution of anti-corruption related activities.
The Conference now meets every two years. Its first session was held in 
Jordan in December 2006; the most recent session was held in Panama in 2013; 
and the next one is scheduled to take place in the Russian Federation in 2015.34 
The Conference has established three working groups: on prevention, on asset 
recovery, and the Implementation Review Group (IRG). The IRG was set up to 
guide the review process, to identify challenges and good practices, and to consider 
technical assistance requirements in order to ensure effective implementation of 
the Convention.35 This leads me to my next point: the question of how we can 
assure that the Convention is actually implemented. 
B. AN OVERVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW MECHANISM 
Adherence to the Convention is becoming a leading indicator of a Government’s 
willingness to address corruption seriously. However, while ratification of the 
number of jurisdictions are adopting legislation that permits confiscation without a 
conviction, international cooperation in NCB confiscation cases remains quite challenging 
for a number of reasons. First, it is a growing area of law that is not yet universal; therefore, 
not all jurisdictions have adopted legislation permitting NCB confiscation or enforcement 
of foreign NCB orders or both. Second, even where NCB confiscation exists, the systems 
vary significantly. Some jurisdictions conduct NCB confiscation as a separate proceeding in 
civil courts (also known as civil confiscation) with a lower standard of proof than in criminal 
cases (balance of probabilities); others use NCB confiscation in criminal courts and require 
the higher criminal standard of proof. Some jurisdictions will only pursue NCB confiscation 
after criminal proceedings were abandoned or unsuccessful, while others pursue NCB 
confiscation in proceedings parallel to the related criminal proceedings.
33. Ibid, art 63.
34. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Conference of the States Parties to the United 
Nations Convention against Corruption” (2016), online: <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/
treaties/CAC/CAC-COSP.html>.
35. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Implementation Review Group of the United 
Nations Convention against Corruption” (2016), online: <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/
treaties/CAC/IRG-sessions.html>.
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Convention is essential, it is only a first step. Governments must not only “talk 
the talk but also walk the walk”—and implement the Convention. In this 
respect, significant progress has been achieved with the adoption of the landmark 
Implementation Review Mechanism (IRM).36
It must be pointed out that the Convention itself does not contain any 
review mechanism. Therefore, it was a great breakthrough that, at its third 
session in Doha in November 2009, the Conference of the States Parties adopted 
Resolution 3/1 on the review of the implementation of the Convention.37 In that 
resolution, the Conference set forth the terms of reference of the IRM and the 
draft guidelines for governmental experts and the secretariat in the conduct of 
country reviews.
The IRM aims at assisting countries to meet the objectives of the Convention 
through a peer-review process. Under the IRM, which has been fully operational 
since 2010, all States Parties are reviewed on the fulfilment of their obligations 
under the Convention. This further enhances the potential of the Convention by 
providing the means for countries to assess how they perform in implementation, 
identify potential gaps in national anti-corruption laws and practices, and develop 
action plans to strengthen the implementation of the Convention domestically. 
There are two review cycles of five years each: The ongoing first cycle addresses 
the implementation of Chapters III and IV of the Convention on criminalization 
and law enforcement, and on international cooperation in criminal matters. The 
second cycle, likely to be launched in 2014, will focus on Chapters II and V of 
the UNCAC, concerning preventive measures and asset recovery.38
Reviews are based on responses to a self-assessment checklist submitted by 
countries under review. Each State Party is reviewed by two other States Parties 
in the context of the peer-review process. After the initial self-assessment, 
the reviewing States perform a desk review of that assessment. To clarify any 
remaining issues, this is followed by a joint meeting in Vienna or a country visit. 
So far, the vast majority of States Parties has opted for a country visit, where the 
reviewing experts can meet with representatives from the relevant anti-corruption 
authorities, the judiciary, and—if the State Party under review so wishes—other 
stakeholders like representatives of the private sector and civil society.
36. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Mechanism for the Review of Implementation 
of the United Nations Convention against Corruption” (2016), online: <http://www.unodc.
org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/IRG.html>.
37. The Conference of the States Parties to the United Nations Convention against Corruption, 
Review mechanism, Res 3/1, UNCAC, 3d Sess, UN Doc CAC/COSP/2009/15 (2009).
38. Ibid at paras 3-4.
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The outcome of the review process is a comprehensive report on national 
anti-corruption legislation and practice, which also lists good practices as well as 
challenges identified in the review process, and makes recommendations on how 
the national law could be amended to bring it further in compliance with the 
Convention. An Executive Summary of that report is presented to the IRG and 
is published on the UNODC website.
Let me be frank: The IRM is a very costly exercise. Reviewing experts are 
sent—literally—to the four corners of the world to conduct country visits, 
and to Vienna to attend the IRG meetings. But the IRM is achieving tangible 
results. It is providing a platform through which States Parties have been able to 
share practices and information. Through the IRM and related training, we are 
creating an international community of anti-corruption experts and we are both 
professionalising and de-politicizing the fight against corruption. Already over 
the first few years of its existence, the IRG has become a marketplace of ideas and 
an agora for the international anti-corruption discourse.
C. AN OVERVIEW OF THE WORK OF UNODC IN ANTI-CORRUPTION
In its capacity as the guardian of the implementation of the UNCAC and 
Secretariat of the Conference of the States Parties to the Convention, UNODC 
is mandated to support the IRM, which has become a cornerstone of UNODC’s 
work in the field of anti-corruption. Nevertheless, UNODC is also active in the 
prevention of corruption, education, training, and technical assistance. We work 
with the private sector and with academia. So let me highlight a few of the most 
important areas where we are working to tame corruption. 
UNODC, through its Thematic Programme on Action against Corruption 
and Economic Crime, acts as a catalyst and a resource to help States Parties ratify 
and effectively implement the provisions of the Convention. A primary goal of 
the anti-corruption work done by UNODC is to provide States Parties with 
practical assistance and build the technical capacity needed to ensure compliance 
with the requirements of the Convention.
1. TECHNICAL	ASSISTANCE
With regard to technical assistance, UNODC has continued to offer tailored 
legislative and capacity-building activities and tools that facilitate assistance 
delivery on the ground. Other UNODC initiatives in the area of technical 
assistance include the anti-corruption advisor programme. The programme aims 
to provide long-term and on-site specialized expertise through the placement of 
field-based anti-corruption advisors, principally in UNODC’s regional offices. 
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There are currently advisors with regional responsibilities in Thailand (for 
Southeast Asia); South Africa, Mozambique, and Senegal; Fiji (for the Pacific); 
Nepal (for South Asia); Panama (for Central America); and Egypt (for the Middle 
East and North Africa). One advisor, responsible for assisting small island States, 
is based in Vienna.
As a comprehensive framework for concerted action at the national and 
international levels to prevent and combat corruption, the Convention can be 
used as a benchmark for the design, implementation, and evaluation of technical 
assistance programmes and projects geared towards enhancing the capacity 
of States Parties to deal effectively with the challenges posed by corruption. 
Bearing this in mind, UNODC has been developing a series of technical 
assistance services to meet the growing demands of States Parties in this field, 
including the following:
• Provision of advice and expertise to support the development of 
a wide range of policies and programmes to ensure the effective 
implementation of the UNCAC provisions on the prevention 
of corruption, including national anti-corruption strategies and 
action plans, codes of conduct, asset declaration systems, conflict of 
interest policies, and human resource management systems based 
on principles of efficiency, transparency, and objective criteria;
• Provision of advice and expertise to support the development of 
domestic legislation aiming at ensuring full compliance with the 
provisions of the UNCAC, as well as the development of such tools 
as legislative guides, model legislation, and electronic libraries;
• Provision of advice and expertise to support States Parties in setting 
up and strengthening the institutional framework required by the 
UNCAC in the areas of investigation, prosecution, and international 
cooperation to combat corruption, including asset recovery;
• Building and strengthening partnerships between the public and 
the private sector against corruption, and promoting, in this 
regard, the business community’s engagement in the prevention 
of corruption by, inter alia, developing initiatives to promote and 
implement public procurement reform and identifying elements of 
optimal self-regulation in the private sector. 
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2. ANTI-CORRUPTION	EDUCATIONAL	CURRICULUM;	ANTI-CORRUPTION	
ACADEMIC	INITIATIVE;	KNOWLEDGE	TOOLS
Another fundamental area for UNODC is education. We need to educate 
the young on fairness and integrity today so that we can have ethical leaders 
tomorrow. Our approach is two-fold: First, focus on tertiary education through 
the development of anti-corruption curricula for law schools and business 
schools. Second, embed the values and ethics of the UNCAC in younger children 
by teaching the values that are the bedrock of the Convention. 
UNODC plays a leading role in the Anti-Corruption Academic Initiative, 
a collaborative academic project aimed at producing a comprehensive 
anti-corruption curriculum composed of individual academic modules, syllabi, 
case studies, educational tools, and reference materials that may be integrated 
by universities and other academic institutions into their existing programmes. 
To date, over thirty universities have participated in the Initiative through the 
incorporation of anti-corruption learning into graduate and postgraduate 
courses.39 UNODC has also recently finalized a comprehensive course for 
university students aimed at developing an understanding of the measures needed 
to fight corruption at the national level. The course provides students with an 
introduction to the issue of corruption and explores measures that governments 
can take to combat it, using the Convention as a framework.40
In the framework of the Corruption Knowledge Management and Legal 
Library Project, UNODC developed an anti-corruption portal entitled TRACK 
(Tools and Resources for Anti-Corruption Knowledge), a web-based platform, 
in cooperation with the World Bank, Microsoft, and other TRACK partner 
institutions. The TRACK website has two main components: a Legal Library 
related to the UNCAC, which contains legislation and jurisprudence relevant 
to the Convention from over 175 states, systematized in accordance with the 
requirements of the Convention;41 and an anti-corruption learning platform 
where analytical materials and tools generated by TRACK partner organizations 
can be searched and accessed.42
39. TRACK, “Our Members” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2014), online:  
<http://www.track.unodc.org/Academia/Pages/Members.aspx>.
40. TRACK, “The United Nations Convention against Corruption Academic Course” United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2014), online: <http://www.track.unodc.org/Education/
Pages/AcademicCourse.aspx>.
41. TRACK, “Legal Library” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2014), online:  
<http://www.track.unodc.org/LegalLibrary/Pages/default.aspx>.
42. TRACK, “ACAD,” supra note 39.
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3. WORK	WITH	THE	PRIVATE	SECTOR;	MAJOR	PUBLIC	EVENTS;	MATCH-
FIXING
The private sector has come to realize that the fight against corruption is a win-win 
situation: Business thrives where laws are defined clearly and applied all-inclusively. 
We are currently seeing that the desired level playing field is becoming a legislated 
playing field. Again, one of the main reasons is the UNCAC, which requires 
States Parties to take a series of measures that together lay the foundation for free 
and fair markets and sustainable economic development. 
The private sector and corporate community have a key role to play in 
enhancing integrity, accountability, and transparency. The rapid development 
of rules of corporate governance around the world is prompting companies to 
focus on anti-corruption measures as part of their mechanisms to protect their 
reputations and interests of their stakeholders. Internal checks and balances are 
increasingly being extended to a range of ethics and integrity issues. Article 12 of 
the Convention requires States Parties to take measures to prevent corruption in 
the private sector, including through enhanced accounting and auditing standards. 
It also provides a menu of suggested measures to achieve these goals, including 
by promoting cooperation between the private sector and law enforcement 
agencies; promoting standards and procedures designed to safeguard the integrity 
of private entities (including codes of conduct and business integrity standards); 
promoting transparency among private entities; preventing conflicts of interest; 
and ensuring effective internal audit systems.43
UNODC has supported an initiative entitled “The United Nations 
Convention against Corruption as a Framework to Mainstream Anti-corruption 
Safeguards for the Organization of Major Public Events.” The initiative aims at 
identifying good practices, based on the Convention, for preventing corruption 
in connection with the organization of major public events. Based on an initial 
review of existing measures, practices, experiences, and concrete cases, as well as 
the recommendations of an expert group, a handbook of good practices has been 
prepared and was officially launched at the last Session of the Conference of the 
States Parties in Panama.44 It contains a Corruption Prevention Checklist, based 
43. UNCAC, supra note 11, art 12.
44. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, The United Nations Convention against 
Corruption: A Strategy for Safeguarding against Corruption in Major Public Events (Vienna: 
United Nations, 2013), online: <http://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/
Publications/2013/13-84527_Ebook.pdf>.
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on the relevant provisions of the UNCAC, which is designed to substantially 
mitigate risks throughout the process of organizing public events.45
One of the new and emerging forms of crime on which UNODC has 
been actively working over the last years is that of match-fixing and illegal 
betting. In collaboration with the International Olympic Committee (IOC), 
UNODC commissioned a study entitled Criminalization Approaches to Combat 
Match-Fixing and Illegal/Irregular Betting: A Global Perspective.46 The study 
provides a comparative overview of relevant criminal law provisions applicable 
to match-fixing and illegal/irregular betting from eighteen countries throughout 
the world that address these issues, either through general offences that may 
be applicable in this field or through ad hoc sport-related offences. UNODC 
has also participated in the negotiation process of the new Council of Europe 
Convention on the Manipulation of Sports Competitions,47 which has just been 
opened for signature in September. 
In broader terms of prevention of corruption in the private sector, UNODC 
has been actively engaged in a multi-stakeholder project, undertaken together 
with OECD and the World Bank, to develop a practical handbook for businesses 
that will bring together guidelines and related material on private sector 
anti-corruption compliance.48 In addition, UNODC has produced a practical 
guide for business, entitled An Anti-Corruption Ethics and Compliance Programme 
for Business: A Practical Guide,49 which will be launched at the Fifth Session of the 
Conference of the States Parties.
Another project being implemented by UNODC, with the support of the 
Siemens Integrity Initiative, is entitled “Public-Private Partnership for Probity 
in Public Procurement,” which seeks to reduce vulnerabilities to corruption in 
public procurement systems and bridge knowledge and communication gaps 
between public procurement administrations and the private sector.50 A good 
45. Ibid, Annex.
46. (Vienna: UNODC, 2013).
47. Committee of Ministers, 1205th Meeting, CETS No 215 (2014).
48. Anti-Corruption Ethics and Compliance Handbook for Business (np: OECD, 
UNODC & World Bank, 2013), online: <http://www.oecd.org/corruption/
Anti-CorruptionEthicsComplianceHandbook.pdf>.
49. (Vienna: UNODC, 2013), online: <https://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/
Publications/2013/13-84498_Ebook.pdf>.
50. See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “The 6 Ps: Public-Private Partnership for 
Probity in Public Procurement” (2010), online: <https://business.un.org/en/needs/302>.
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practices guide on preventing corruption in public procurement, in line with 
Article 9 of the UNCAC, was published last year.51
Further, UNODC and the United Nations Global Compact continue to 
cooperate on the interactive e-learning tool for the private sector entitled “The 
Fight against Corruption.”52 Between February 2012 and November 2013, the 
tool has had 24,000 online users, and a certificate programme was launched in 
early 2013. The tool is available in other official United Nations languages and 
other languages, including German, Korean, and Portuguese.
4. JUDICIAL	INTEGRITY	AND	CAPACITY
The establishment of an independent and effective justice system that safeguards 
human rights, facilitates access to all, and provides transparent and objective 
recourse is a core value held the world over. As a result, judicial and legal reform 
is consistently a priority on the agendas of countries regardless of their state of 
development. Yet the complex and multifaceted nature of achieving the ends 
of justice has challenged efforts to identify a coherent set of issues warranting 
the time and attention of reformers, and slowed the subsequent formulation of 
specific prescriptions and guidelines on what can be done to improve the quality 
of justice delivery across the system.
The effects of corruption on the rule of law are not only harmful, but 
destructive—in particular, when the criminal justice system, which should 
embody the principles of independence, impartiality, integrity, and equality, is 
undermined. A corrupt act during one step of the criminal justice chain can 
severely harm the whole process or even nullify its essence and erode public trust 
in law and order.
UNODC has been actively promoting the concept of judicial integrity and 
supported a number of States Parties to the UNCAC through the provision 
of technical assistance, with projects being carried out in Nigeria, Ethiopia, 
Tunisia, and Kosovo (under UNSCR 1244/99).53 In doing so, UNODC has 
51. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Guidebook on Anti-Corruption in Public 
Procurement and the Management of Public Finances: Good Practices in Ensuring Compliance 




52. (2010), online: <http://thefightagainstcorruption.org/certificate/>.
53. Security Council Resolution 1244/99.
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developed a Resource Guide on Strengthening Judicial Integrity and Capacity,54 with 
the purpose of supporting and informing those who are tasked with reforming 
and strengthening the justice systems of their countries, as well as development 
partners, international organizations, and other providers of technical assistance 
who provide support to this process.
In addition, UNODC has developed an implementation guide for Article 
11 of the Convention on “Measures relating to the judiciary and prosecution 
services,”55 including a practical evaluative framework for use by States. That 
resource will serve as a valuable tool by identifying and summarizing international 
standards and resources relevant to judicial and prosecutorial integrity.
5. THE StAR	INITIATIVE
Finally, with regard to the recovery and return of assets, UNODC has partnered 
with the World Bank to establish the joint Stolen Asset Recovery (StAR) Initiative 
in 2007. StAR has developed practical tools and policy studies on asset recovery, 
including the Asset Recovery Handbook,56 a best practices guide on income and 
asset declarations,57 and the Good Practice Guide for Non-Conviction Based Asset 
Forfeiture.58 A number of asset recovery training courses have been conducted 
jointly with StAR as well, including regional events in the Pacific Islands, the 
Middle East and North Africa, South and Central America, South and Eastern 
Europe, East and Southern Africa, and South and East Asia.
StAR has also helped push asset recovery to the top of the international 
agenda and to bring international organizations together around a common 
54. (Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2011), online: 
<https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/
ResourceGuideonStrengtheningJudicialIntegrityandCapacity/11-85709_ebook.pdf>.
55. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Technical Guide to the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption (Vienna: United Nations, 2009) at 46-54, online: <https://
www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/Technical_Guide_UNCAC.pdf >.
56. Jean-Pierre Brun et al, Asset Recovery Handbook: A Guide for Practitioners (Washington, DC: 
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development & The World Bank, 2011), 
online: <http://star.worldbank.org/star/sites/star/files/asset_recovery_handbook_0.pdf>.
57. Ruxandra Burdescu et al, Stolen Asset Recovery: Income and Asset Declarations: Tools and 
Trade-Offs (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2009), online: <https://www.unodc.org/
documents/corruption/Publications/StAR/StAR_Publication_-_Income_and_Asset_
Declarations.pdf>.
58. Theodore S Greenberg et al, Stolen Asset Recovery: A Good Practices Guide for Non-Conviction 
Based Asset Forfeiture (Washington, DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development & The World Bank, 2009), online: <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
FINANCIALSECTOR/Resources/Stolen_Assest_Recovery.pdf>.
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agenda. Asset recovery now figures prominently in commitments by the G20 and 
is an integral part of the G20 Anti-Corruption Strategy. Moreover, in the context 
of the so-called Arab Spring, the Arab Forum on Asset Recovery was launched 
in 2012 in support of the asset recovery efforts by Arab Countries in Transition. 
The StAR Initiative supported the second meeting of the Arab Forum on Asset 
Recovery, held in Marrakech, Morocco, in October 2013. A joint concept for 
activities under the Arab Forum was developed and, on that basis, a workplan 
for 2014 was established. The third meeting of the Arab Forum was just held in 
Geneva from 1-3 November 2014.59
Only recently, the Initiative has helped return to Tunisia $28.8 USD million 
from Lebanon,60 as well as recovered assets in cooperation with France, Italy, 
and Spain valued at $58 million USD.61 Compared to the billions of dollars 
that are stolen from countries every year by corruption, this may seem to be too 
little, too late. But we must not underestimate the formidable challenges faced 
by international financial investigations: An asset in a foreign country has to 
be linked to a specific suspect and to a corruption offence committed by this 
person. Suspects may have accounts all over the world, and, more often than not, 
they will not be registered under their name. Mutual legal assistance requests 
may have to be sent to a dozen jurisdictions with different laws and in different 
languages. So, I believe that, given that we only embarked on this task seven years 
ago, we have come a long way. But we need to manage expectations in order to 
avoid frustration.
III. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
The UNCAC, as a powerful manifestation of the collective political will of the 
international community to put in place a robust framework in the fight against 
corruption, has achieved a lot. But, clearly, we have not yet tamed corruption. 
Legislators of States Parties need to establish an adequate and comprehensive 
legal framework to give practical effect to the relevant provisions of the UNCAC. 
However, the main challenge for States Parties is to improve the capacities of 
59. The World Bank & United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Arab Forum on Asset 
Recovery” Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative (2014), online: <http://star.worldbank.org/star/
ArabForum/About>.
60. Jean-Pierre Brun & Richard Miron, “Tunisia’s cash-back,” Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative (12 
April 2013), online: <http://star.worldbank.org/star/news/tunisia%E2%80%99s-cash-back>.
61. Michelle Kennedy, “International Efforts in Support of the Recovery of Stolen 
Assets” FCPA Professor (blog) (4 November 2015), online: <http://fcpaprofessor.com/
international-efforts-in-support-of-the-recovery-of-stolen-assets/>.
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criminal justice institutions to effectively combat corruption domestically; 
cooperate internationally in the investigation, prosecution, and adjudication of 
corruption-related offences; and further enhance asset recovery mechanisms to 
identify, seize, and return the proceeds of crime.
In this regard, UNODC will continue to provide, upon request, specialized 
substantive and technical expertise to competent authorities and officials 
of Member States with specific emphasis on international cooperation and 
criminalization. The establishment of the IRM of the UNCAC provides the 
opportunity for collecting, systematizing, and assessing valuable information on 
how technical assistance needs in the above mentioned fields can be identified, 
and on possible ways and means to meet those needs in the context of reviewing 
the implementation of the Convention.
Is the IRM perfect yet? Maybe not. One thing I would personally like to see is 
a greater involvement of civil society and NGOs in the process. They can provide 
invaluable contributions and we cannot hope to tame corruption without them. 
Unfortunately, some States Parties are blocking any move to grant NGOs access 
to the meetings of the IRG. But this is symptomatic of both the challenges and 
the opportunities that come with the universality of the Convention. Of course, 
it might be easier to make progress within a like-minded group of countries. But 
the added value of the UNCAC lies precisely in its global reach. 
We may never fully eradicate corruption, just like we will never be able to 
eradicate crime or terrorism. Maybe that is part of the price we have to pay to live 
in an open, free, and democratic society, and not in a police state. But, actually, 
the more transparent and democratic is a society, the more resilient it seems to be 
against corruption. And the more corruption is tamed, the more open societies 
can thrive. So this is why we must continue to make every effort we can to tame 
corruption, even if it seems a Sisyphean struggle.
